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STATEMENT OF THE CASE

NATURE OF THE CASE

This is a partnership dissolution case which primary deals with the application and
distribution of the partnership's real property. The two partners were formally involved in a
romantic relationship and when the relationship ended, the business partnership dissolved as well.
Because the parties had no written partnership agreement, the Idaho Uniform Partnership Act,
Idaho Code Section 30-23-101 et. seq. governs the winding up of the partnership business. It is
Appellant's contention on appeal that the District Court failed to follow the dictates of the UP A
and the long established precedents favoring liquidation by: ( 1) ordering a buyout of Appellant's
interest in the partnership property, (2) granting summary judgment regarding the value of the
partnership property and the equity therein, (3) failing to determine that Appellant owns 50 percent
of the partnership and thus is entitled to 50 percent of any remaining surplus after creditor
obligations and partner contributions are satisfied, (4) fixing the sale price of the partnership
property if it sold to Appellant and attributing 100 percent of any gain in equity after the dissolution
to Mr. Guenther, and (5) fixing the sale price of the partnership property if it sold on the open
market.
Idaho law does not provide for the remedy ordered by the District Court in its Amended
Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law.

However, the District Court correctly denied Mr.

Guenther's Motion for Amended Order for Sale of Property and ordered the sale of the property
on the open market. The District Court further correctly denied Mr. Guenther attorney fees as the
gravamen of the case is not a commercial transaction, but to enforce the statutory scheme of
dissolution per Idaho partnership law.
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STATEMENT OF FACTS AND COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS

Please see Appellant's opening brief for a thorough description of the facts and the course
of proceedings in this matter.
On May 25, 2018, Mr. Guenther filed a Memorandum of Costs and Request for Attorney
Fees. R., p. 694. On June 7, 2018, and July 17, 2018, Ms. Ryerson filed Defendant's Objection
to Plaintiff's Memorandum ofCosts and Requests for Attorney Fees and Defendant's Supplemental
Objection to Plaintiff's Memorandum of Costs and Requests for Attorney Fees, respectively. Mr.

Guenther then filed his Response to Defendant's Supplemental Objection to Plaintiff's
Memorandum of Costs and Requests for Attorney Fees, on August 1, 2018.

Ms. Ryerson filed

Defendant's Reply to Supplemental Objection to Plaintiff's Memorandum of Costs and Requests
for Attorney Fees on August 3, 2018.

On September 7, 2018, the District Court issued its Memorandum Decision and Order
Denying in Part Plaintiff's Costs and Attorney Fees.

R., p. 933-943.

The District Court

appropriately determined that an award of attorney fees was inappropriate here under 12-120(3),
as the gravamen of the case and its claims is to enforce the statutory scheme of dissolution per
Idaho partnership law. Id.
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ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL

I.

Whether the District Court erred in its application of the Idaho Uniform Partnership Act
and the long-standing precedents favoring liquidation in its Amended Findings of Fact,
Conclusions of Law, its Conclusions of Law, Memorandum Decision Reconsidering
Liquidation, and its Memorandum Decision Granting Summary Judgment.

II.

Whether the District Court erred in its Amended Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, by
ordering the buyout of Appellant's interest in the partnership property.

III.

Whether the District Court erred in granting summary judgment regarding the valuation of
the partnership property and equity therein as of the date of dissolution.

IV.

Whether the District Court erred in its Amended Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law in
failing to determine that Appellant owns 50 percent of the partnership and is thus entitled
to 50 percent of any remaining surplus after creditor obligations and partner contributions
are satisfied.

V.

Whether the District Court erred in its Amended Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law by
fixing the sale price of the partnership property if sold to Appellant or if sold on the open
market, and by attributing 100 percent of any gain in equity after the date of dissolution to
Mr. Guenther.
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ARGUMENT

A.

WHILE THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN ITS AMENDED FINDINGS OF
FACT CONCLUSIONS OF LAW BY ORDERING THE BUYOUT OF
APPELLANT'S INTEREST, THE DISTRICT COURT CORRECTLY DENIED
MR. GUENTHER'S MOTION FOR AMENDED ORDER FOR SALE AND
ORDERED THE SALE OF THE PROPERTY ON THE OPEN MARKET.
1.

Pursuant to Idaho law, the partnership property must be sold on the open
market.

The Idaho Supreme Court has long established that "ordinarily, the trial court will wind up
a partnership by ordering liquidation of the assets and payment of any partnership debts." Arnold
v. Burgess, 113 Idaho 786, 791, 747 P.2d 1315, 1320 (Ct. App. 1987); see also, Mays v. Davis,
132 Idaho 73, 74, 967 P.2d 275, 277 (1998). While Mr. Guenther argues that the general rule
should not be followed here and that Arnold v. Burgess, 113 Idaho 786, 794, 747 P.2d 1315, 1323
(Ct.App.1987) and Kelly v. Silverwood Estates, 127 Idaho 624, 903 P.2d 1321 (1995) support his
forced buyout of Ms. Ryerson's interest, Arnold and Kelly are readily distinguishable from the
case at bar and instead dictate that a sale is required here to address the partnership's non-party
creditors and effectuate a complete winding up.
In Arnold, the partner sought only to be reimbursed for disproportional asset distributions.
Id., 133 Idaho at 792, 747 P.2d at 1321. The partner did not seek liquidation, nor termination of

the partnership. Id., 113 Idaho at 793, 747 P.2d at 1322. The Court of Appeals found a buyout
under the facts was reasonable because "the [district court's] decision settled the partnership's
accounts with respect to [one partner], while allowing the remaining partners to pursue a mutually
satisfactory settlement that might save their individual farming enterprises." Id. However, the
Court of Appeals noted in allowing the buyout in the Arnold case, that the trial court did not have
APPELLANT''S REPLY BRIEF - PAGE 7

the power to address the rights of non-party creditors or to direct that the debts be assumed by one
particular partner with a release of others.

Id.

The Court of Appeal explained: "Without

liquidating the partnership assets, a course of action not sought by any parties, the [trial] court
could not do more without potentially harming the non-party creditors." Id. The Court of Appeals
recognized that the partner being bought out was still subject to partner liabilities. Id., 113 Idaho
at 794, 747 P.2d at 1323. Thus, the Arnold Court allowed the buyout only because liquidation and
termination were not sought, and the result of the buyout was an incomplete dissolution and
winding up, because the trial court had no power to address the non-party creditors.
Arnold is clearly distinctive from the facts of this case and makes clear the power of Idaho
courts in winding up partnerships. In order for a court to affect a complete winding up and
dissolution of a partnership, liquidation is necessary to address the non-party creditors. Arnold v.
Burgess, 113 Idaho at 793-794, 747 P.2d at 1322-1323.
Mr. Guenther likewise erroneously relies upon Kelly v. Silverwood Estates, 127 Idaho 624,
628,903 P.2d. 1321, 1325 (1995). The Kelly Court allowed the trial court's distribution of assets,
as opposed to liquidation, only because the rational for liquidation did not exist in that particular
case. Id., 127 Idaho at 629-30, 903 P.2d at 1326-27. In Kelly, the party seeking liquidation of the
partnership assets had no equity in the partnership property; discharge of liabilities was not
necessary because the party had secured a discharge of all debts through bankruptcy; and there
could be no surplus/profits attributable to the use of the party's right in the property of the dissolved
partnership. Accordingly, the Kelly Court allowed the distribution because it determined: "This
case does not fall within the pattern generally contemplated by the Uniform Partnership Act in
winding up and termination of a partnership. The Uniform Partnership Act anticipates that a
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withdrawn partner will have some value in the assets of the partnership." Id., 27 Idaho at 629, 903
P.2d at 1326. 1

In contrast, the case at bar is precisely the type of case contemplated for purposes of Idaho
Code § 30-23-806 and the general rule of liquidation. To begin with, both parties have equity in
the partnership property. The amount of equity in the property is disputed by the partners. Both
parties seek dissolution and a complete winding up of the partnership. Discharge of liabilities is
necessary here and both parties are currently responsible for the mortgage on the partnership
property. In addition, Ms. Ryerson asserts she is entitled to the surplus/profits attributable to her
ownership interest. Thus, Arnold dictates that Idaho courts do not have authority to address the
rights of non-party creditors or to require that one party assume liability for partnership debts and
that liquidation is necessary to accomplish a complete winding up. Kelly only stands for the
proposition that a court may order a distribution of assets to affect a full winding up when the
rationale for the general rule of liquidation is not present and when the Court does not have to
address non-party creditors due to a bankruptcy. As the rationale for liquidation and Idaho Code
§ 30-23-806 is present here, the powers of Idaho courts are dictated by Arnold.

As to the cases Mr. Guenther cites from other jurisdictions, they are simply irrelevant and
inapplicable in the face of established Idaho precedents. See Horne v. Aune, 130 Wn. App. 183,
197, 121 P.3d 1227, 1233-1234 (Wash.App.2005); andDistotell v. Stiltner, 100 P.3d 890, 894-895
(Alaska 2004). This Court need not look beyond Idaho to address the issues in this present case.
The District Court appropriately determined in its original ruling that an analysis of each of the
fact patterns in those cases was not helpful in reaching a decision under Idaho law, and indeed the

While the analysis in Kelly is based on the former Idaho Uniform Partnership Act, which was
repealed, the new Act is substantively the same.
1

APPELLANT''S REPLY BRIEF - PAGE 9

District Court never changed its opinion of the cases. R., p. 373. The out of state cases cited by
Plaintiff are inapplicable because they do not interpret the Idaho Uniform Partnership Act and do
not involve the situation where one of the parties sought liquidation, or where the partners
disagreed as to the value of the partnership assets. In Horne, supra, the Washington appellate
court allowed a buyout, but specifically noted that it was allowing such only because there was no
debate regarding the value of the partnership assets. The court provided: "Historically, liquidation
equaled forced sale because that was deemed the most accurate method of valuing partnership
assets. But where, as here, the parties stipulate to the partnership assets' value, there is no reason
to equate liquation with forced sale." Id., 130 Wn.App. at 197, 121 P.3d at 1234. Then in Disotell
v. Stiltner, supra, the Alaska Supreme Court allowed a buyout, but determined it was error to

permit a buyout where there was not clear evidence of the partnership property's fair market value.
Id., 100 P.3d at 894-895. Thus, because these cases do not interpret Idaho law and do not present

fact patterns similar to the case at bar, where one partner seeks dissolution due to disagreement
regarding valuation, the cases are not helpful here. Furthermore, and most importantly, these cases
do not aid Idaho courts in effecting a complete winding up and dissolution of a partnership, when
under Idaho law the courts cannot address the rights of non-party creditors or direct that the debts
be assumed by one particular partner with a release of others. Arnold v. Burgess, 113 Idaho at
793-794, 747 P.2d at 1322-1323.
Accordingly, liquidation as articulated in Arnold is applicable here and dictates that the
District Court should have ordered the partnership property sold in its Amended Findings ofFact,
Conclusions of Law. Nonetheless, the District Court's ultimate denial of Mr. Guenther's Motion
for Amended Order for Sale of Property, and order that the property be sold on the open market

was indeed correct under Arnold and Idaho law.
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2.

If Idaho Code § 30-23-703 is inapplicable, Mr. Guenther has no legal basis for
his buyout of Ms. Ryerson's interest in the partnership.

Mr. Guenther argues that the District Court erred in applying Idaho Code § 30-23-703(c)
and in ultimately ordering the sale of the property on the open market. Ms. Ryerson agrees that
the statute is inapplicable as set forth in detail in her opening brief. See Appellant's Brief, pp. 2225. However, if the statute is inapplicable, the Arnold decision dictates liquidation is necessary to
effectuate a complete winding up and Mr. Guenther has no legal basis for his requested buyout
remedy.
In its Clarification of Conclusions of Law, Memorandum Decision Reconsidering

Liquidation, the District Court recognized the dictates of Arnold, but introduced LC. § 30-23703(c) and held"[w ]hile this Court does not have the power to direct a partner to assume all debts
and cannot determine the rights of any non-party creditor, Idaho Code§ 30-23-703(c) provides a
means for a partner to consent to assume debts or for the partnership to transfer liabilities to any
remaining partner in order to ensure a dissociated partner is not required to repay debts obtained
during the partnership." R., p. 774. Idaho Code § 30-23-703(c) provides the following:

By agreement with a creditor of a partnership and the partnership, a person
dissociated as a partner may be released from liability for a debt, obligation, or
other liability of the partnership.

Idaho Code § 30-23-703(c).

Based upon (a) this statute and (b) Plaintiffs multiple

misrepresentations that he had obtained approval for a loan from Zion's Bank (the non-party
creditor of the partnership), to buy the property and completely release Defendant Ryerson from
any liability under the mortgage, the District Court concluded it had authority to order the buyout
even absent Defendant Ryerson's consent. R., p. 772-774, Thus, given the holding of the Arnold
decision, LC. § 30-23-703(c) is the means by which the District Court ordered that Plaintiff could
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buy the real property from the partnership and buyout Ms. Ryerson's interest in the partnership
property.

If LC. § 30-23-703( c) is not applicable, as Plaintiff now correctly contends it is, Arnold
and the general rule favoring liquidation govern here. In other words, Plaintiff has no mechanism
for a buyout because Arnold dictates that liquidation is necessary to address the non-party creditors
and to effectuate a complete winding up.

While Plaintiff makes economic waste arguments, the District Court correctly and
consistently held that Plaintiffs economic waste arguments on their own were not enough to
circumvent Idaho's general rule of liquidation, and the out of state cases upon which Plaintiff relied
did not present fact patterns which were helpful in reaching a decision under Idaho law. R., p.373;
R., p.774. While the District Court cited to some specific language in Arnold regarding economic
waste, the hook that the District Court relied upon was Idaho Code § 30-23-703(c). Indeed, Mr.
Guenther has cited no Idaho authority that provides a buyout may be ordered where non-party
creditors exist, one of the partners seeks liquidation and both partners seek a complete winding up.
Because Mr. Guenther has no Idaho authority to support the alternative remedy he seeks, the
general rule ofliquidation on the open market must govern. Furthermore, Mr. Guenther's specific
arguments that a sale on the open market will result in waste are simply irrelevant given Idaho
courts cannot address the rights of non-party creditors.

Nevertheless, Mr. Guenther's waste arguments completely ignore that Ms. Ryerson
contests Mr. Guenther's valuation of the property. Ms. Ryerson has disagreed with Mr. Guenther's
valuation of the property since the beginning of the litigation, and it is for this reason she seeks
liquidation - not mere animosity, as Mr. Guenther contends. A sale on the open market will reveal
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the property's true fair market value and equity therein to be distributed to the partners. Mr.
Guenther's economic waste argument is based on the District Court's erroneous decision at
summary judgment which capped the value of the property at $600,000 and capped the equity at
$144,789.92. TR., March 29, 2018: p. 72-81. Using these low ambiguous numbers, Ms. Ryerson
would only receive a proportional share of her unpaid contributions and no additional
surplus/profits if a buyout was ordered. Low numbers are obviously advantageous to Mr. Guenther
because he seeks to buyout Ms. Ryerson's interest and to keep the property and its remaining
equity to himself. However, Ms. Ryerson submitted her declaration setting forth her opinion that
the fair market value of the property as of March 2017 was $800,000. R., p. 527-533. A sale on
the open market, as contemplated by Idaho's UPA, will provide the property's true market value
and provide for the greatest return and fairest return on the partners' investment. Consequently,
Mr. Guenther's economic waste argument is flawed and disingenuous, and it favors his own
interest at the expense of his partner without legal basis. See also Appellant's Brief, pp. 26-27.

Accordingly, because LC. § 30-23-703(c) is inapplicable and Mr. Guenther has no legal
basis for his alternative remedy, Ms. Ryerson is entitled to rely upon the general rule ofliquidation
as pronounced in Arnold to affect a complete wind up of the partnership's business.

3.

If I.C. § 30-23-703(c) is applicable, liquidation on the open market is required,
because there was no agreement between Mr. Guenther and Zion' Bank (the
non-party creditor).

While it is Ms. Ryerson's argument that LC. 30-23-703( c) is not applicable, if this Court
determines that the statute is applicable, the District Court still correctly denied Mr. Guenther's

Motion For Amended Order For Sale ofProperty and correctly ordered the sale of the property on
the open market.
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As set forth above, the District Court ordered the buyout of Ms. Ryerson's interest in the
partnership pursuant to Idaho Code§ 30-23-703(c) and Mr. Guenther's multiple representations
that he had obtained approval for a loan from Zion's Bank, even absent Ms. Ryerson's consent.
R., pp. 772-774. The District Court ordered in relevant part the following in its Amended Findings
ofFact, Conclusions ofLaw:

8. Because Guenther has made the largest share of labor and financial contributions to the
partnership, and maintained the property at his own expense after March 26, 2017, if he
wants to buy the property from the partnership, in order to satisfy the outstanding mortgage
to Zions Bank, Joseph Guenther may purchase the real property (located at 8571 N. Lost
Sage Lane, Boise Idaho 83714, including approximately 21.65 acres, conveyed in a 2009
Warranty Deed to "Joseph Guenther and Michelle G. Ryerson, unmarried persons") from
the partnership by July 31, 2018 by a refinance with Zions Bank that completely
terminates the Deed of Trust including Ryerson, then pays $34,749.58 in cash proceeds at
the closing to the trust account of Jacobson & Jacobson, PLLC, for distribution in the
winding up, and with all closing costs paid at Guenther's expense.

9. If Guenther is unable or unwilling to buy the real property as ordered in #8 above, then
after July 31, 2018, Ryerson may buy the real property (located at 8571 N. Lost Sage Lane,
Boise Idaho 83714, including approximately 21.65 acres, conveyed in a 2009 Warranty
Deed to "Joseph Guenther and Michelle G. Ryerson, unmarried persons") from the
partnership in order to satisfy the outstanding mortgage to Zions Bank for the property
value in the appraisal conducted for the Guenther sale. Michelle Ryerson may buy the real
property by August 31, 2018 for cash or by refinance that completely terminates the Deed
of Trust including Guenther, with all closing costs paid at Ryerson's expense, and then
pays $110,040.34 and any increase in value between $600,000.00 and the appraised value
at sale in cash proceeds at closing to the trust account of Givens Pursley LLP for
distribution in the winding up. The increase in value between $600,000 and the appraised
value will be held in escrow. The Court will then require an accounting of mortgage, utility,
maintenance, taxes, and labor costs incurred by Guenther for the maintenance of the
partnership property between March 26, 2017 and August 31, 2018, and the Court's
determination of fees and costs for this litigation has been made. Ryerson must close or file
with the Court a notice that she does not intend to purchase the real property by August 31,
2018.
13. If neither Guenther or Ryerson purchases the real property as directed in #8 or #9 above
by August 31, 2018, then the property is to be listed for sale on the open market with the
price set as the real property value in the appraisal Guenther obtained in his efforts to
refinance the property by July 31, 2018 plus six percent of that value.
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R., pp. 804-805 (emphasis added). Thus, the Court specifically ordered that Mr. Guenther's
buyout of Ms. Ryerson's interest was to occur by July 31, 2018 by a refinance with Zion's Bank,
and ifhe was unable to do so, then after July 31, 2018, Ms. Ryerson could purchase the property,
and if neither party purchased the property by August 31, 2018, then the property is to be listed
for sale on the open market.

On July 30, 2018, Mr. Guenther filed Plaintiff's Motion for Amended Order for Sale of

Property. R., p. 863-880. Contrary to Mr. Guenther's previous representations, Zion's Bank
refused to refinance the mortgage in Mr. Guenther's name and to remove Ms. Ryerson's name
from liability under the mortgage. R., p. 864-865. To be clear, Zion's Bank did not need a few
more days to complete the deal, it refused the loan. Mr. Guenther's motion sought additional time
to seek financing from another lender. R., p. 865-866. On August 8, 2018, a hearing was held and
the District Court denied Guenther's motion from the bench and explained that to allow such would
have completely contradicted the District Court's Order, the record of the case, and Idaho law.
TR., August 8, 2018; pp. 12-16. On August 14, 2018, Mr. Guenther filed a Motion to Reconsider

Decision Denying Plaintiff's Motion for Amended Order for Sale of Property. R., p. 908. On
September 5, 2018, another hearing was held and the District Court denied from the bench the
motion and ordered the parties to proceed with selling the property as set forth in the Amended

Findings ofFact, Conclusions ofLaw. TR., September 5, 2018; pp. 13-18.
While Mr. Guenther argues the Court should have amended its order and allowed him
additional time to seek financing with another lender, the Court correctly concluded that to allow
such would have completely contradicted the District Court's Order, the record of this case, and
Idaho law. TR., August 8, 2018; pp. 12-16. The District Court explained at the hearing that its
specification of Zion's Bank as the lender for Mr. Guenther's refinance was not a "typographical

APPELLANT'S REPLY BRIEF - PAGE 15

error", but instead based on Zion's Bank being the third-party creditor for the partnership mortgage
and Mr. Guenther's multiple representations to the District Court throughout the litigation that he
had approval from Zion's Bank to refinance the current mortgage. Id., pp. 14-16. The District
Court stressed that in each of the court's decisions in this matter, Mr. Guenther's representation
that he had approval from Zion's Bank, the third party creditor of the partnership, to refinance the
current mortgage was material to the District Court's decisions. Id.

To illustrate, Mr. Guenther first represented that he had approval from Zion's Bank for the
refinance in the Affidavit of Joseph Guenther in Support of Motion to Reconsider, dated January
18, 2018. R., pp. 393-394. The District Court then held: "Given the new evidence that the third
party creditor will completely release the Defendant of any liability on the mortgage and that
evidence has been provided that economic waste is a factor in this case, the Court finds that the
Plaintiffs refinance of the Property solely in his name and the release of any mortgage liability for
the property will satisfy the requirements set forth by Idaho law regarding partnership dissolution
and wind up." R., Memorandum Decision and Order Granting In Part Plaintiff's Motion for

Summary Judgment and Granting Plaintiff's Motion to Reconsider, p 492. After that decision was
reversed, Mr. Guenther then argued again for a buyout in his Motion for Clarification, and again
represented to the Court that he had obtained approval for a $580,000 loan from Zion's Bank. R.,

Affidavit ofJoseph Guenther in Support ofPlaintiff's Motion to Clarify, p. 733. The Court, relying
upon such mis-information, then ordered the refinance and buyout through Zion's Bank as set forth
above. R., Clarification of Conclusion ofLaw, Memorandum Decision Reconsidering Liquidation,
pp.772-773. Accordingly, the Court fashioned its Order based on the information it had in the
record relative to Zion's Bank, the third-party creditor. TR., August 8, 2018; pp. 12-16. But for
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the letters of supposed approval from the third-party creditor approving refinance solely in
Plaintiffs favor, the Court would not have ordered the buyout. Id.

Idaho Code § 30-23-703( c) requires "agreement with a creditor of a partnership and the
partnership" to release a partner from liability. LC. § 30-23-703( c). Mr. Guenther had no such
agreement. Thus, because there was no agreement for purposes of LC. 30-23-703(c), Plaintiff had
no basis under Idaho law to support his alternative remedy. See Arnold v. Burgess, 113 Idaho 786,
793, 747 P.2d 1320, 1322 (Ct. App. 1987). To have amended the District Court's order to allow
a new lender and a new lending scheme would have completely contradicted the District Court's
interpretation of the statute and the record of the case. Accordingly, if LC. § 30-23-703(c) is
applicable, the District Court appropriately denied Mr. Guenther's Motion for Amended Sale and
ordered the sale of the property on the open market according to its order. (The District Court's
decision here further demonstrates that Mr. Guenther's economic waste arguments on their own
are not sufficient to circumvent the holding Arnold.)

B.

THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN DETERMINING THAT MS. RYERSON WAS
INCOMPENTENT TO TESTIFY AS TO HER PROPERTY'S VALUE AND IN
GRANTING SUMMARY JUDGMENT REGARDING THE VALUATION OF THE
PARTNERSHIP PROPERTY.
Mr. Guenther argues that the District Court correctly determined that Ms. Ryerson's

testimony was insufficient to create an issue of fact, that the District Court cited the Weaver and
Warzburg cases simply for the general rule that an owner of property may testify concerning the
property's fair market value, and that such cases are distinguishable from the present case because
the property owners in those cases testified as to a specific fair market value and identified the
basis for their opinion.

Mr. Guenther fails to recognize or address that the District Court cited

those cases not to set forth the general rule that property owners can testify concerning the
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property's fair market value, but to support its erroneous conclusion that the presumption is
rebuttable at the summary judgment stage, before the owner even testifies, if the court determines
the witness is incompetent. TR., March 29, 2018: p. 72-81. Mr. Guenther is also simply inaccurate
that Ms. Ryerson did not testify as to a specific fair market value and that she did not identify a
basis or foundation for her opinion. See R., p. 530, 531, 532, and 533.

As set forth in detail in Appellant's opening brief, the District Court misinterprets and
misapplies the presumption in such a way that essentially makes the presumption non-existent.
While the presumption is straight forward and relatively simple, the District Court offered an
erroneous and confusing decision as to why Ms. Ryerson, despite being an owner, would not be
allowed to testify as to the valuation of her property and would not be allowed to cross-examine
Mr. Guenther's general appraiser as to her qualifications and valuation. The District Court's
decision confused the foundation necessary for an owner's testimony along with how and when
the presumption may be rebutted. Contrary to the District Court's assertions, Rankin specifically
provides that the general foundation requirements for a witness are not required for an owner of
property due to the presumption that the owner is familiar with the property. Rankin v. Caldwell,
15 Idaho 625, 632, 99 P. 108 (1908).

In addition, Rankin provides that the weight of the

presumption is "another question" which may be affected by cross-examination as to the basis for
such knowledge, but nonetheless does not disqualify the owner as a witness. Id. Thus, an owner
is afforded the presumption and is allowed to testify and any weighing or rebuttal of the testimony
comes after the testimony and after both parties have presented their evidence.

The cases that followed Rankin on this issue, such as Weaver and Warzburg, are consistent
with the holding of Rankin and an owner's right to testify. See Weaver v. Village of Bancroft, 92
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Idaho 189, 439 P.2d 697 (1968) and Warzburg v. Kootenai County, 155 Idaho 236, 308 P.3d 936
(Ct.App.2013). The District Court's decision confuses the holdings of Weaver and Warzburg;
these decisions in no way support the contention that inquiry into the foundation of an owner's
testimony should be made prior to the testimony and that the owner can be precluded from
testifying if the testimony is not found by the court to be sufficiently substantiated. (Please see
Appellant's opening brief for a thorough analysis of each case.) To the contrary, these cases
provide that an owner may testify as to the value of her property and the weight afforded such
testimony occurs after the testimony is given and both parties have submitted their evidence. See
Weaver v. Village of Bancroft, 92 Idaho at 192-193, 439 P.2d at 701-702; and Warzburg v.
Kootenai County, 155 Idaho 242, 308 P .3d at 944. Thus, Ms. Ryerson was entitled to the

presumption and her testimony should have been determined to be sufficient for summary
judgment purposes.

The District Court erroneously concluded that Ms. Ryerson's testimony was incompetent.
An owner of property is presumed to be familiar with its value by reason of inquiries, comparisons,
purchases and sales. Rankin v. Caldwell, 15 Idaho at 132, 99 P. at 108. Ms. Ryerson's declaration
more than demonstrates that she is familiar with the property value through such bases and many
more. To begin with, contrary to Mr. Guenther's assertions, Ms. Ryerson's declaration sets forth
her opinion that the specific fair market value of the property as of March 2017 was $800,000. R.,
p. 530, 531, 532, and 533. Mr. Ryerson's declaration then provides:

In addition, my opinion regarding the fair market value was and continues
to be based on inquiries, comparisons, purchases and sales of similar
properties. I have compared similar properties and evaluated their fair
market valued in determining the fair market value of my Property.
Attached as Exhibit A is an example of an appropriate comparison I have
obtained and which supports my opinion of the value ofmy Property.
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R., p. 531. Ms. Ryerson provides that her opinion is based on her knowledge of the local real
estate market, home values similar to her home, vineyards, vineyard businesses and vineyard
estates. Id.

In addition, Ms. Ryerson provides that her knowledge of her own contributions and Mr.
Guenther's contributions to the property forms a basis for her opinion regarding the fair market
value. R. pp. 530-531. Ms. Ryerson's provides that she was involved in obtaining financing for
the property and she contributed significant capital and sweat equity to the property, (as set forth
in detail in the Declaration of Michelle Ryerson in Opposition to Plaintiff's Motion for Summary
Judgment). R., pp. 529-530. She provides that her contributions included but were no limited to

assisting with the vineyard preparation and planting, fertilizing, irrigating, assisting with the
construction of a new well house/bar, coordinating and overseeing the design and building of the
house and installing the landscaping. R., p. 530.

Mr. Ryerson further provides that her valuation of the property considered the vineyard
component of the property, which the appraisal offered by Mr. Guenther did not. Id. Ms. Ryerson
sets forth her experience working and contributing in the vineyard in contrast to Mr. Guenther's
general real estate appraiser, who had no qualifications in appraising vineyard properties and
estates. R., p. 530-531. She further explains that the appraisal performed by Mr. Guenther's
appraiser did not include the vineyard, the investment to create the vineyard and/or the potential
for the vineyard to produce income in the future.

R., p. 531. Accordingly, Ms. Ryerson's

declaration more than demonstrates that she has personal knowledge of the fair market value of
the property.
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As to Mr. Guenther's argument that Ms. Ryerson lacked personal knowledge because she
made inquiry of a real estate professional and attached a flier (a comparison) from a similar piece
of property, these are precisely the type of inquiries and comparisons an owner makes and
considers in forming their knowledge and opinion as to the value of the property. Ms. Ryerson's
conversation with the real estate agent and the comparison were not set forth in her declaration to
establish the truth of what the real estate agent said or the comparison provided, but only to show
that Ms. Ryerson made reasonable inquiries and comparisons in forming her own opinions. Ms.
Ryerson's declaration specifically states that her valuation regarding the fair market value was
based and continues to be based on her own knowledge of the property and that she referenced the
real estate professional only to show that her valuation was based on various inquiries and
comparisons, not simply an ambiguous number. R., p. 530.

Accordingly, because Ms. Ryerson was entitled to the presumption, and she provided
competent testimony that the property was valued at $800,000, her testimony created an issue of
fact for purposes of avoiding summary judgment. Thus, the District Court erred in granting
summary judgment on the issue and in denying Ms. Ryerson's motion for reconsideration.

C.

THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN ITS AMENDED FINDINGS OF FACT
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW IN FAILING TO DETERMINE THAT APPELLANT
OWNS 50 PERCENTS OF THE PARTNERSHIP AND IS THUS ENTITLED TO 50
PERCENT OF ANY REMAINING SURPLUS AFTER CREDITOR OBLIGATION
AND PARTNER CONTRIBUTIONS ARE SATISFIED.
Mr. Guenther argues that the District Court correctly held that Ms. Ryerson failed to prove

that she owns 50 percent of the partnership and its profits, and that the court's finding was a simple
finding of fact which should not be overturned. However, as set forth in Appellant's opening brief,
the issue is not simply a finding of fact, but the District Court's misinterpretation ofldaho Code§
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30-23-806 and the District Court's erroneous conclusion that the ratio of the parties' capital
contributions to the partnership determines the partners rights to remaining profits. The test is not
the partners' capital contributions, but their rights to share in distribution pursuant to their
transferable interest. See LC.§ 30-23-806(b); LC.§ 30-23-102(a)(3); and LC.§ 30-23-102(a)(l 1).
Thus, since Ms. Ryerson presented uncontested evidence2 of her 50 percent ownership in the
partnership (or transferable interest), the District Court erred in failing to conclude that she owned
a 50 percent ownership interest and thus is entitled to 50 percent of any remaining surplus.
To further illustrate, Idaho Code § 30-23-806 provides that in winding up its business, a
partnership shall apply its assets to discharge its debts and then if there is any surplus such surplus
must be distributed to each partner according to their unreturned contributions. LC. § 30-23-806(a)
and (b )(1 ). Then if any surplus remains, it is to be split "among the partners in proportion to their
respective rights to share in distributions .... " LC. § 30-23-806(b)(2). In other words, if a surplus
remains after contributions are returned, it is to be split among the partners pursuant to their
transferable interest or interest owned in the partnership. See LC.§ 30-23-102(a)(3) and LC.§ 3023-102(a)(l 1). Nowhere does the statute provide that profits are to be spilt among partners
pursuant to their ratio of capital contributions or expenses paid.
In the present case the District Court found the following;
37.
As to Ryerson' s Counterclaim claiming that the oral agreement was
that the partnership profits were to be split 50:50 based on tax deductions
claimed or the form of ownership of the real property, Ryerson has failed to
show by a preponderance of the evidence that Ryerson actually paid fifty
percent of the expenses of the partnership or that Ryerson and Guenther
even had an agreement that she would pay fifty percent of the expenses of
the partnership. Based upon this failure and considering the UPA above,
Ryerson's Counterclaim is Dismissed.

2

In fact, as discussed below Ms. Ryerson presented at trial deposition testimony and tax returns, signed under
penalty of perjury, wherein Mr. Guenther also admitted that the partnership ownership percentages were 50% for
each partner.
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R., p. 803 (emphasis added). Thus, instead of basing the partners' rights to profits on their
transferable interest the District Court based their rights to profits based on capital contributions
and expenses the parties made. The District Court misinterpreted the statute and applied the wrong
test. The District Court's misinterpretation is further illustrated by the language quoted by Mr.
Guenther. See Mr. Guenther and Cross-Appellant's Openging Brief, pp. 29-30. The District
Court's findings indicate that Ms. Ryerson's testimony at trial was that the partnership agreement
was 50:50 ownership percentage, but then the District Court gets bogged down in discussions
regarding expenses and equates payment of partnership expenses with rights to profits. R. pp. 782783. Whether Ms. Ryerson paid 50 percent of the expenses is irrelevant to whether she owns 50
percent of the partnership.
To support Ms. Ryerson's claim of 50 percent ownership, she offered testimony and
evidence. TR., April 2, 2018: p. 183-184. Ms. Ryerson testified that the parties did not have a
written partnership agreement, but that the parties were in a romantic relationship and agreed that
the partnership ownership percentage would be a 50/50 split. Id. Ms. Ryerson further testified that
the tax returns for the partnership evidence that each partners' share was 50 percent. Id. Mr.
Guenther admitted during his testimony that the profits would have been shared 50/50. TR., April
2, 2018: p. 141-142. He also admitted that the tax returns showed a 50/50 ownership. TR., April
2, 2018: p. 141-143.

While Mr. Guenther argued that the tax returns were inaccurate, he

nevertheless admitted that he signed the tax returns and knew at the time he signed them, under
oath, that they represented a 50/50 ownership split. Id. Mr. Guenther further admitted that in a
previous litigation regarding zoning complications on the property, he testified under oath during
a deposition that he and Ms. Ryerson were partners and each of them owned a 50 percent share in
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the property.

TR., April 2, 2018: p. 14-145. Mr. Guenther provided no evidence that the

partnership ownership was anything other than a 50/50 split.
Accordingly, since the District Court misinterpreted the statute and the test that determines
a partner's right to the remaining surplus, and Ms. Ryerson presented uncontested evidence of her
50 percent ownership interest in the partnership, (and indeed the District Court's language
suggests that it found she owns a 50 percent ownership interest in the partnership), the District
Court erred in failing to conclude that she is entitled to 50 percent of any surplus that remains
following the discharge of debts and the payment of partnership contributions.
D.

THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN ITS AMENDED FINDIGS OF FACT,
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW BY FIXING THE SALE PRICE OF THE
PARTNERSHIP PROPERTY IF SOLD TO APPELLANT OR IF SOLD ON THE
OPEN MARKET, AND BY ATTRIBUTING 100 PERCENT OF ANY GAIN IN
EQUITY AFTER THE DATE OF DISSOLUTION TO MR. GUENTHER.

The District Court erred in holding that Ms. Ryerson could only purchase the property for
the new appraisal price ($725,000) and in attributing all the gain in equity to Mr. Guenther after
the March 26, 2017 dissolution. By ordering such, the District Court determined that Ms. Ryerson
did not have any interest or right to the equity after dissolution. As set forth in Appellant's opening
brief this was inappropriate given that the equity in the property remains partnership property until
the wind up is complete. See I.C. §30-23-802(a) ("Even after a partnership is dissolved, the
partnership continues for the purpose of winding up its business."). The UP A contemplates
liquidation of partnership assets and a determination of the parties' equity interests at the time of
winding up, not at the time of dissolution. See LC. §30-23-806.
While Mr. Guenther cites two cases which provide it is a general rule that assets are to be
valued as of the time of dissolution, Mr. Guenther provides no case authority that the rule has been
applied recently or under the new Idaho Uniform Partnership Act. See Burnham v. Bray, 104
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Idaho 550, 556, 661 P.2d 335, 341 (Ct. App. 1983); Wahlen v. Siaperas, 93 Idaho 265, 267, 460
P.2d 400, 402 (1969). Furthermore, the rule does not provide how increases in equity, after the
time of dissolution, are to be distributed.
In any event, and more importantly, the ownership of the property and equity did not
change simply because the partnership dissolved on March 26, 2017. The property is still titled to
both partners and the equity therein thus belongs to both partners. While Mr. Guenther argues that
Ms. Ryerson "abandoned the property" and that he now makes the mortgage payment, he ignores
the huge fact that Ms. Ryerson still remains liable on the mortgage. As she is still liable on the
mortgage, the mortgage affects her credit and her ability to receive additional financing. During
the pendency of this litigation Ms. Ryerson has been unable to purchase a home ofher own because
she remains liable on the mortgage here. Mr. Guenther is making the payments here because he
continues to exclusively live at the property and choses to do so. If Mr. Guenther stopped making
the mortgage payments, Ms. Ryerson would be legally responsible.

Ms. Ryerson did not

"abandon" the property, she simply moved away from Mr. Guenther when their personal
relationship ended. Mr. Guenther surely cannot be arguing that Ms. Ryerson should have benn
occupying the property with him since the dissolution. Thus, as the property continues to belong
to Ms. Ryerson and she continues to be liable on the mortgage, she is entitled to the equity post
dissolution.
As the UP A contemplates liquidation of partnership assets for the fair market value, the
property should have been ordered sold and the distributed pursuant to LC. § 30-23-806. Any
appropriate unpaid contributions made by Mr. Guenther (such as mortgage payments made post
dissolution) would have been addressed by the statute. However, the statute does not provide that
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Mr. Guenther can live rent free at the partnership property and then capture the total increase in
the value of the property.
The District Court also erred in fixing the sale price of the property if neither party bought
the property pursuant to the order, but it sold on the open market. R., p. 805. The District Court
set the price at $725,000. R., p. 740 and 805. The District Court cited no authority for its fixation
of the sale price here. Fixing the sale according to an appraisal done in February of 2018, prohibits
the partnership from seeking the full market value of its assets at the time of the sale. The
independent realtor selected by the parties was provided a copy of the February 28, 2018 appraisal
and suggested a new appraisal was needed. Declaration of Counsel in Opposition of Motion to

Stay Sale of Property Pending Appeal, at ,-r 10, Ex.I. p. 2. As set forth above, and in Appellant's
opening brief, the UPA contemplates the liquidation of partnership assets at their fair market value
and then distributing the proceeds to satisfy creditor obligations, unpaid contributions and the
transferable interests of the partners. See LC. § 30-23-806, Arnold v. Burgess, 113 Idaho at 792,
47 P.2d at 132; Mays v. Davis, 132 Idaho at 74, 967 P.2d at 277. The partners must be free to list
the property pursuant to the market at the time of sale and to seek the best return from their
investment. The independent realtor selected by the partners should determine the listing price, not
the District Court. The District Court erred in fixing the price of the property if sold to Ms. Ryerson
and attributing all gain in equity after March 26, 2017 to Mr. Guenther, and in fixing the sale price
if the property is sold on the open market.

E.

THE DISTRICT COURT CORRECTLY DENIED MR. GUENTHER'S REQUEST
FOR ATTOREY FEES.
Mr. Guenther argues that District Court erred in denying him attorney fees because the

District Court failed to separately address the gravamen of each of the claims. Specifically, he
argues that the gravamen of each of the claims here is a commercial transaction because Ryerson's
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counterclaim focused on the parties alleged oral agreement.

Mr. Guenther misinterprets the

District Court's opinion, fails to recognize that any discussions regarding partnership percentages
and contributions were for the purpose of determining rights under the Idaho Uniform Partnership
Act, and fails to recognize that the Idaho Supreme Court's decision in Kelly v. Silverwood Estates,
127 Idaho 624, 631, 903 P.2d 1321, 1328 (1995), is directly on point and controlling here.
Mr. Guenther seeks attorney fees under Idaho Code Section 12-120(3).

Idaho Code

Section 12-120(3) provides attorney fees to the prevailing party in lawsuits concernmg a
commercial transaction. LC. § 12-120(3). However, "[ a ]n award of attorney fees is not warranted
every time a commercial transaction is remotely connected with a case." Kelly v. Silverwood

Estates, 127 Idaho at 631, 903 P.2d at 1328. Rather, the test is whether the commercial transaction
comprises the "gravamen of the lawsuit." Id.; see also Kugler v. Nelson, 160 Idaho 408,413, 394
P.3d 571, 579 (2016). "Attorney fees are not appropriate under LC. § 12-120(3) unless the
commercial transaction is integral to the claim and constitutes the basis upon which the party is
attempting to recover." Kelly v. Silverwood Estates, 127 Idaho at 631, 903 P.2d at 1328, quoting

Spence v. Howell, 126 Idaho 763, 776, 890 P.2d 714, 727 (1995).
The Idaho Supreme Court has held that an action to enforce a statutory penalty is not a
commercial transaction. Grumprect v. Doyle, 128 Idaho 242, 912 P.2d 610 (1995). In addition,
when the gravamen of a case is to enforce a statutory scheme of dissolution, fees are not
appropriate under Idaho Code § 12-120(3). Kelly v Silverwood Estates, 127 Idaho at 631, 903 P .2d
at 1328.

Kelly v. Silverwood Estates, supra, is directly on point and controlling law here. In Kelly,
David and Annette Kelly, owners of K5 Ranch entered into a partnership agreement with
Silverwood Estates, in which Silverwood Estates acquired a one-half interest in K5. Id., 127 Idaho
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at 626, 903 P.2d at 1323.

Subsequently, the Kelly's advised Silverwood that they were

withdrawing from the partnership. Id. They then filed an action for a decree of dissolution, a
formal accounting, a wind up of the partnership affairs, and a distribution of their rightful share of
the partnership assets. Id., 127 Idaho at 627, 903 P.2d at 1324. The district court dissolved the
partnership, wound up the partnership affairs and distributed the partnership assets based on its
findings of the terms of the partnership agreement and the parties' rights under the Idaho statute.
Id., 127 Idaho at 626-627, 903 P.2d at 1323-1324. While Silverwood was determined to be the

prevailing party, the Idaho Supreme Court specifically held that attorney fees under Idaho Code §
12-120(3) were not appropriate under this situation because "[t]he gravamen of [the] case was an
effort to enforce a statutory scheme of dissolution," not a commercial transaction. Id., at 631, 903
P.2d at 1328. Thus, because the case concerned the statutory dissolution of a partnership, and not
a commercial transaction, Silverwood was denied its claim for attorney fees. Id.
In the present case, Mr. Guenther and Ms. Ryerson entered into a partnership agreement to
acquire real property. The parties subsequently determined to dissolve the partnership. Mr.
Guenther then filed an action for dissolution of the partnership and distribution of the partnership
assets under the Idaho Partnership Act. Throughout the course of the litigation, the District Court
looked to determine the terms of this partnership agreement in order to determine the rights and
interests of the parties under the Idaho Partnership Act. While Mr. Guenther contends that Ms.
Ryerson's counterclaim and arguments during the course of the litigation as to what the parties
agreed to as part of their partnership agreement somehow distinguishes this case from Kelly, Mr.
Guenther's argument is without merit. In both cases it was necessary for the parties to argue the
terms of the agreement and their respective interests to establish their rights under the statute. Ms.
Ryerson's arguments regarding partnership ownership percentages and her contributions to the
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partnership were made to demonstrate her rights under the Idaho's statutory scheme of dissolution.
Mr. Guenther cannot articulate how Ms. Ryerson's argument regarding her interests under the
Idaho statute are any different from what occurred in Kelly. Thus, Kelly is controlling here and
dictates that attorney fees under Idaho Code§ 12-120(3) are not appropriate here.
"The determination to award or not award attorney fees is committed to the discretion of
the trial court." Fosterv. Shore Club Lodge, Inc., 127 Idaho 921,927,908 P.2d 1228. 1234 (1995).
In setting forth its decision denying Mr. Guenther attorney's fees, the District Court considered
the individual claims and provided the following:
. . .[T]he Court finds the focus of the motions and trial was a judicial
determination of the percentage of interest in the Partnership between the two
partners and how to divide the assets and liabilities of the Partnership. The
testimony at trial and exhibits admitted dealt almost exclusively with individual
partner contributions to the partnership and the focus of this litigation was Counts
One and Four of the Complaint and the Counterclaim.
R., p. 939. The District Court then correctly held:
Here, the Court finds the discussion of the oral agreement on partnership
percentage was for the purpose of determining the partnership interest for winding
up under the Idaho Partnership Act. Therefore, the parties' arguments were made
for the purpose of dissolution, which falls directly under the statutory scheme and
the holding in Kelly. Because the gravamen of the lawsuit was the dissolution of
the partnership under the statute, the Court finds attorney's fees are not appropriate.
R., p. 942. The District court then disallowed Mr. Guenther's requested attorney fees. Id. The
District Court's decision makes clear it considered the gravamen of each of the claims and
determined the discussions regarding an oral agreement was necessary for the purpose of
determining rights under the statute. The District Court correctly held that Kelly is controlling
here, and that attorney's fees are inappropriate. Thus, the District Court clearly acted within its
discretion and did not, in any way, abuse that discretion.
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While Mr. Guenther cites to Johnson v. Crossett, 162 Idaho 200, 408 P.3d 1272 (2018),
Mr. Guenther does not understand the actual holding of the case and thus misapplies it here. In
Johnson, two individuals, Johnson and Crossett, entered into an oral agreement to form a limited
liability company and agreed to certain terms. Id., 408 P.3d at 1274. The terms included the
following: Crossett would be sole agent and manager, receive a fixed salary and own 46% interest.
Id. Johnson would not be involved in the everyday operation, nor would he receive compensation,

but would own 44% interest. Id. Crossett filed a certificate of organization to form the LLC as a
single member. Id. A written operating agreement was prepared; however, it was never signed,
and Johnson specifically refused to sign the agreement. Id., at 1274-75. Johnson and Crossett
never came to terms and Crossett declared that he would operate the LLC as a single member. Id.,
at 1275. Johnson (and others) then sued Crossett alleging he improperly expelled them from the
LLC and breached his fiduciary duties as a member and manager of the LLC by failing to make
distributions during the operations of the LLC. Id. The district court held that Johnson failed to
prove he and others were members of the LLC. Id., at 1275-76. The district court held that
although Johnson and Crossett agreed at the outset that they would become members of the LLC,
the oral agreement included the understanding that Johnson and the others would become members
only when they signed the written operating agreement. Id. The district court then awarded
Crossett attorney fees pursuant to LC. § 12-120(3). Id., at 1276.
The Idaho Supreme Court affirmed the district court's award of attorney fees. Id., at 127980. The Court held that although the Idaho Uniform Limited Liability Act (LLA) was related to
the action, the gravamen of the action was a dispute between individuals for a claimed contractual
breach of an oral agreement and failure to make profit distributions that were not related in any
way to the winding up and dissolution of the LLC, which was a commercial transaction. Id., at
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1280. Johnson was not a dissolution case. Though it dealt with statutory remedies, the Court
found that those remedies were based on an effort to enforce the alleged agreement of the parties
to make distributions of profit during the life of the company, and not upon its dissolution. The
Court distinguished Kelly, where in Kelly the gravamen of the action related to partners
enforcement of statutory provisions to effect the dissolution of a partnership. Id. Conversely, in
Johnson, "the gravamen of the Appellant's action was a claim between individuals for damages
on failing to divide profits of an enterprise as was allegedly agreed." Id.
The present case is not Johnson and is clearly much more akin to Kelly, which remains
good law. This is a dissolution case. Like in Kelly, the parties here were partners, in an undisputed
partnership, and they seek the application of the UPA to determine the rights and interest of the
parties. Moreover, the parties seek to be discharged of all liability under the current mortgage and
to affect a full and complete accounting and windup of the partnership.
Likewise, Mr. Guenther's reliance on Idaho Transp. Dep 't v. Ascorp, Inc., 159 Idaho 138,
357 P.3d 863 (2015) is misplaced as the facts of the present case are readily distinguishable, and

Kelly is directly on point. Mr. Guenther's claim for declaratory judgment to quiet the title of
property and that the property may be sold in winding up the partnership is all part of Mr.
Guenther's action for dissolution, distribution of assets and winding up of the partnership affairs,
as was sought in Kelly.
Given that Kelly is controlling here and the gravamen of the case, and each of the claims,
is to enforce the statutory scheme of dissolution per Idaho partnership law, the District Court
appropriately determined, per its discretion, that attorney fees are not appropriate under LC. § 12120(3).
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F.

MR. GUENTHER IS NOT ENTITLED TO ATTORNEYS' FEES AND COSTS ON
APPEAL
Mr. Guenther argues he is entitled to attorneys' fees and costs on appeal pursuant to Idaho

Appellate Rules 40(a), 41 and LC. § 12-120(3). As Mr. Guenther is not the prevailing party and
attorney's fees are not recoverable in this action, Mr. Guenther's request should be denied.

CONCLUSION
Based upon the foregoing and Appellant's opening brief, Appellant and Cross-Respondent
Michelle Ryerson respectfully requests that the Court: ( 1) Reverse the District Court's decision
ordering the buyout of Ms. Ryerson's interest in the partnership property and hold that the property
must be liquidated and sold on the open market for its fair market value; (2) Reverse the District
Court's decision granting summary judgment on the issue of valuation of the partnership property
and equity, and remand if necessary so Ms. Ryerson may offer her testimony and evidence
regarding the value of her property; (3) Reverse the District Court's decision that the partners'
respective ownership percentages are based off the ratio of the parties' capital contributions to the
partnership, and hold that Ms. Ryerson owns 50 percent of the partnership and is thus entitled to
50 percent of any remaining surplus after creditor obligations and partner contributions are
satisfied; (4) Reverse the District Court's decision fixing the sale price of the partnership if sold to
Ms. Ryerson or if sold on the open market and attributing 100 percent of any gain in equity after
the date of dissolution to Mr. Guenther, and hold that the property must be sold on the open market
value as determined at the time of sale by the parties' independent realtor and the proceeds
distributed pursuant to LC. § 30-23-806 (first to creditor obligation, then to partner contributions
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and then pursuant to the partner's transferable interest or interest owned in the partnership); (5)
Affirm the District Court's decision to deny Mr. Guenther's Motion for Amended Order for Sale
ofProperty and to order the sale of the property on the open market; (6) Affirm the District Court's
denial of attorney fees to Mr. Guenther; and (7) Deny Mr. Guenther's request for attorney's fees
and costs on appeal.
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